Vietnam’s Russian Restocking
| Mar 20, 2011 14:18 EDT |
Related Stories: Asia - Other, Contracts - Intent, Force Structure, Issues - International, Missiles - Anti-Ship, Missiles - Precision Attack, Other Corporation, Russia, Submarines, Underwater Weapons
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1st advanced light frigate accepted. (March 18/11)
In April 2009, reports surfaced that Vietnam had agreed in principle to a deal with Russia for 6 of its diesel-electric Kilo/ Project 636 Class fast attack submarines. There have been rumors that Vietnam owns 2 ex-Yugoslav mini-submarines for use in commando operations, but the Vietnamese People’s Navy doesn’t own any full size submarines that can take on enemy subs and ships. That’s about to change, thanks to a December 2009 contract.
Nor is that the only change in Vietnam’s military capabilities these days. China’s April 2009 display of naval might is only part of the mosaic influencing Vietnam’s decisions in these matters, as contracts for submarines – and far more – are being signed with its long-time Russian ally:
- Vietnam’s New Military Buys: Considerations [updated]
- Contracts and Key Events (2009 – Present) [updated]
- Additional Readings [NEW]
Vietnam’s New Military Buys: Considerations
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China’s 2009 display of naval might certainly marks an increased shift toward “forward defense” farther from its borders, a policy that must eventually include China’s trade lifeline to Vietnam’s south, through the Straits of Malacca. It also underlined a growing gap between China’s increasingly advanced ships and high capacity hovercraft, and Vietnam’s fleet of older Soviet and even American ships.
Ownership of the Spratly Islands remains very much in dispute, and Vietnam and China share a centuries-long history of mutual distrust and occupation. Recent punctuations of that animosity include the 1979 3rd Indochina War; this was followed by a significant skirmish in 1981, and a naval skirmish over the Spratly Islands in 1988. Today, Vietnamese protests over a Chinese bauxite mine in Vietnam, and media disobedience over the Spratly Islands issue, serve as a reminder that the 1989 treaty has not changed the relationship’s underlying fundamentals.
China itself has adopted a strategy of building up a submarine force to counter a superior surface opponent (the US Navy). It is entirely logical for Vietnam to adopt a similar approach vis-a-vis China, especially given that China’s lifeline of raw materials and exported goods leading from and to Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and parts of Asia passes right by Vietnam’s doorstep.
Aside from Thyssen Krupp Marine’s U209 family of submarines, the Russian Kilo Class are the world’s most widely exported subs. They’re known for a level of quietness that’s significantly better than other Russian designs, and have been produced in the Project 636 and Project 877EKM “Improved Kilo” variants. Countries operating or ordering these submarines include Russia, Algeria, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Poland, and Romania.
There had been some speculation that Vietnam’s emphasis on shallow water operations, and proximity to the Straits of Malacca, might have made DCNS’ novel 885t, $200 million Andrasta Class of “pocket submarines” attractive. Instead, Vietnam appears to have opted for a more widely-deployable, higher capacity 2,300t submarine from its tried and true Russia partner.
The new submarines are the most important new Russian addition to Vietnam’s capabilities, but they are not alone. Stealthy Gepard-class light frigates will add surface warfare and patrol punch, for a fleet that’s mostly made up of aging Soviet Fast Attack Craft and captured American ships from the Vietnam War. In the air, Vietnam’s SU-27s will be joined by new multi-role SU-30 planes from the same fighter family.
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This section covers only Vietnamese contracts with Russia. As the “Additional Readings” section notes, Russia is not Vietnam’s exclusive arms provider – but it is the country’s most important relationship.
March 5/11: The Vietnamese Navy officially accepts the first Gepard class frigate from Russia, naming it the Dinh Tien Hoang, after the first Vietnamese emperor. Vietnam became the class’ 1st export order with a contract for 2 ships in December 2006, and the Dinh Tien Hoang was launched in August 2009. The 2nd frigate in the order was launched in March 2010, and has been in sea trials since August 2010.
The Gepard 3.9 ships are a combined diesel-turbine export version of Russia’s Project 11611 (Tartarstan) frigates, which serve in the Caspian fleet. The 102m/ 2,100t design sits in the grey area between small frigates and large corvettes, and despite their 5,000nm endurance, they’re best suited to local maritime patrol and interdiction. Their stealth-enhanced ship design and sub-sonic Kh-35E anti-ship missiles make them potentially dangerous adversaries in littoral regions, and other armament includes 76.2mm and 30mm guns, 533mm torpedoes, depth charges, and a 9K33M “OSA-M”/SS-N-4 missile system for air defense. This size and weapons array may not be much to get excited about, relative to other international frigate designs, but it will make them Vietnam’s most capable combat ships. March 2010 reports indicate that orders for 2 more could follow. DatViet report [Google translate] | AvWeek Ares.
March 27/10: RIA Novosti reports that Chinese admirals are beginning to grasp the implications of advanced diesel-electric attack submarines in the hands of several regional neighbors, located right near China’s shipping lifelines.
Vietnam’s Kilo Class, Malaysia’s Scorpene Class, and Singapore’s Vastergotland Class submarines are all on China’s Southeast Asian radar, while in the background, Indonesia continues to express its intent to buy Kilo Class submarines of its own.
March 25/10: It’s good to be a good customer. Russian defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov says that Russia will help Vietnam build the submarine base it needs to house its new Kilos, provide a loan to help buy rescue and auxiliary vessels and planes for Vietnam’s navy, and build a ship repair yard. That yard would benefit the Russians, too, as it could service visiting Russian navy ships.
Vietnam’s geographic position could make its service yard attractive to other navies as well, giving other countries even more reason to focus on relations with the Southeast Asian nation. A good service yard could wind up being as important to Vietnam’s geo-political position as the submarines themselves. Associated Press | China’s Xinhua.
March 23/10: Russia’s Voice covers growing ties between Russia and Vietnam, which is becoming one of Russia’s biggest arms customers:
“Vietnam backs multilateral cooperation with Russia especially in military defense, stated Vietnam’s president Nguyen Minh Triet during talks with Russia’s Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov in Hanoi. “Each of Russia’s victories is like our own, the president said, and we support Russia in the Georgian conflict.” The president said that the US decision not to deploy its ABMs in Eastern Europe is also a victory for Russia….. Anatoly Serdyukov noted that Vietnam is Russia’s strategic partner and Russia is ready to train Vietnamese personnel at the Russian Defense Ministry’s academies.”
March 16/10: Russia’s Zelenodolsk PKB shipyard launches Vietnam’s 2nd Project Gepard 3.9 light frigate into the River Volga. In May 2010, the warship will sail to St. Peterburg and then travel by sea to Vietnam for sea trials. The 1st ship in the order was launched in August 2009.
A separate report indicates that Vietnam could be preparing to order 2 more light frigates of this type. ITAR-TASS [in Russian] | ITAR-TASS Arms [in Russian].
Feb 10/10: Interfax reports the signing of a formal contract between Russia and Vietnam for 12 SU-30MKK fighters, for delivery in 2011-2012, plus associated weapons, service, and support. The deal is reportedly worth $1 billion, and is signed the day after a Russian contract to build Vietnam’s first nuclear plant. Agence France Presse | AP | RT | Straits Times.
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Dec 15/09: Shortly after Vietnam makes its defense white paper public, reports indicate that it has ordered 6 Kilo Class submarines and 12 SU-30MKK fighter jets from Russia, during a visit to Moscow by Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung.
Russia’s Interfax news agency quoted an unnamed Defense Ministry official on Dec 15/09, who said the submarines were earlier model “Project 636” types, and gave the deal’s value at of $2 billion, with delivery taking place at a rate of 1 submarine per year. The Sukhoi Su-30MK2 fighter jet deal was valued at $600 million, and would raise Vietnam’s SU-27/SU-30 family fleet to 20 fighters.
Vietnam also invited Russia to help build its 1st nuclear power plant, and hopes to begin construction in 2014 and put it on line by 2020. The country has been growing its manufacturing capacity in recent years, partly at China’s expense, and needs to improve its electric grid in tandem. Vietnam’s Thanh Nien News | RIA Novosti | Agence France Presse | Associated Press | BBC News | China’s Xinhua | Agence France Presse analysis.
Dec 4/09: Russia’s RIA Novosti reports:
“According to the Vedomosti business daily, Moscow and Hanoi are close to sign deals on the purchase of six Kilo class diesel-electric submarines and 12 Su-30MK2 Flanker-C multirole fighters. The submarine contract, worth an estimated $1.8 billion, includes the construction of on-shore infrastructure and training of submarine crews and will be the second largest submarine contract concluded by Russia since the Soviet era after the 2002 deal on the delivery of eight subs to China.”
April 27/09: Initial media reports. The submarine deal’s value is reported to be around $1.8 billion, and the SSKs would be built at Admiralty Shipyards in St. Petersburg. In addition to submarines, the Vietnamese Navy order is said to include new heavyweight torpedoes and missiles (most likely Klub family) to arm them.
Some of the Russian reports note that these 6 submarines were once planned for Venezuela, adding that Russia’s Rosoboronexport canceled the deal following Hugo Chavez’ meeting with US President Barrack Obama. That must be judged an extraordinarily thin public rationale for canceling a $1.5+ billion purchase. A sinking global oil market, and Venezuela’s growing economic dependence on its declining oil production for revenue, are far more likely reasons for any delay and/or shift. See: RIA Novosti | MosNews | St. Petersburg Times | Singapore Straits Times | Defpro.
